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Most sports fans and sports analysts, for all their
hours examining their teams, are fundamentally
wrong about one important aspect of sports. Most of
these spectators decide which teams are good or
bad right now based on their winning and losing
streaks. They shouldn't.
How often have you seen sports analysts castigate a
team for losing four straight games or a player with
a .300 batting average for going hitless for five games? It's pretty frequent, right? But this
frequency alone should tell you something. The fact is that the best teams and the best
players have slumps. And, to take the baseball season as an example, in a 162-game
schedule, the best teams and players are even likely to have more than one slump per
season. These slumps aren't necessarily due to the team or the player doing anything
different or wrong. Rather, they're based on the laws of probability. To put it in slightly
jargony terms, "there's much randomness in the world." And randomness doesn't make an
exception for sports.
The best professional baseball teams, the ones that make the playoffs, generally win about
60 percent of their games. Using probability theory and Monte Carlo simulations, we've
proved that the probability of a team that wins 60 percent of its 162 games having at least
one losing streak of five or more games is 80 percent. Such a team will have, on average,
1.2 such losing streaks a season. In other words, it's almost a certainty that a playoff team
will have had at least one substantial losing streak during the regular season. So it shouldn't
have been shocking -- and was hardly informative about their future -- that the Detroit
Tigers ended the season on a five-game losing streak. The worst teams, in comparison,
generally win only 40 percent of their games. (For example, in the 2006 baseball season,
Tampa Bay and Kansas City won 37.7 and 38.3 percent of their games, respectively.) Using
probability theory and Monte Carlo techniques, we've shown that the probability of such a
team having at least one winning streak of three or more games is virtually 100 percent.
Such a team will have, on average, 6.4 such winning streaks a season. In other words, even
the worst teams can expect to have winning streaks. That's why it shouldn't have been so
shocking that the Detroit Tigers, with the third-best American League regular-season record,
ended the season by losing all their games against the Kansas City Royals, the second-
weakest AL team.
It seems that only a few people in sports get this basic point. How else can one account for
their surprise after the St. Louis Cardinals had an eight-game losing streak at the end of the
season and, yet, went on to demolish the San Diego Padres in the first round of the National
League playoffs? Sports commentator Joe Morgan, who often talks about the importance of
momentum, surely doesn't get it. Morgan almost invariably explains how he thinks baseball
teams will do in the next game based on how they did in the previous few games. Now there
could be such a thing as momentum. But simply probability theory can explain many of the
streaks we observe in baseball. What Joe Morgan and others should really say is, "Team A
has been lucky during its last four outings, but it is still a weak team, and so we shouldn't
expect it to be lucky today."
One person who distinctly does get the point is Oakland A's General Manager Billy Beane.
Beane, whom we discuss in our book Making Great Decisions, recognizes that his job is to
get his team to the playoffs, where whoever wins has more to do with luck than skill. As
Michael Lewis wrote in Moneyball:
Pete Palmer, the sabermetrician and author of The Hidden Game of Baseball, once
calculated that the average difference in baseball due to skill is about one run a
game, while the average difference due to luck is about four runs a game. Over a long
season the luck evens out, and the skill shines through. But in a series of three out of
five, or even four out of seven, anything can happen.
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As Billy Beane put it, when asked by Lewis why he was so detached during the 2002
playoffs, "My s**t doesn't work in the play-offs. My job is to get us to the play-offs. What
happens after that is f***ing luck."
So what does this have to do with business and with life in general? A lot. There's a huge
difference between decisions and outcomes. Decisions can be good even if bad outcomes
follow or bad even if good outcomes follow, all because of the role of chance and luck. Luck
and probabilities have a huge role. Here's an example from our Making Great Decisions in
Business and Life.
Imagine that you own two uranium processing plants, and you believe that good decisions
should be measured solely by the good outcomes they produce. The plants generate the
same revenues, but one plant (Plant A) has 30 percent lower labor costs than the other
(Plant B). Plant A certainly is enjoying a better outcome -- higher profits, quarter after
quarter. For the last six years, Plant A's outcomes have been better than Plant B's by any
objective measure. So it follows that Plant A's managers have made better decisions, right?
How could anyone argue with this? If you had a bonus pool to distribute, would you give
more to the Plant A's or Plant B's managers and workers?
Before you hand out the bonuses, disaster strikes. Uranium processing Plant A suffers a
horrible accident, killing four workers and nearly releasing enormous amounts of toxic
radiation into a nearby community. Lawsuits bury your company. How could this happen?
Simple. Plant A workers skipped many safety procedures in their quest to reduce labor costs,
increasing their risk of disaster from infinitesimal to perhaps one accident every 100
months. Each day, they were able to speed their work by skipping burdensome and
"unnecessary" safety procedures.
The Plant A managers were playing Russian roulette, yet you were about to reward them for
their good outcomes during the last six years. Had you studied their decisions instead of
their outcomes, you would have realized that they were making horrible tradeoffs to achieve
their objectives. The question is: which processing plant made the best decisions? The best
decisions are based on the cost of adhering to the safety procedures versus the expected
cost -- or risk -- of skipping them. Managers who base their rewards purely on outcomes will
unwittingly encourage risky behavior that focuses on the short term at the expense of the
long term.
This example, unfortunately, is not fictitious. In 1999, workers at the JCO Co. uranium
processing plant in Tokaimura, Japan didn't follow proper procedures and mixed too much
uranium -- 16 kilograms instead of the approved 2.4 -- with nitric acid in a storage tank and
started a fission reaction that went temporarily out of control. All 310,000 residents in the
city were evacuated, 21 people were sickened, and three workers were hospitalized. While
this may have been an innocent accident, it probably was the result of a technique the JCO
workers used to improve their efficiency.
Luck is like a great wind that blows randomly. It camouflages people's decisions and actions.
Our job, if we want to make good, or even great, decisions, is to look past the wind that
blows today for intrinsic quality and give credit where credit is due. Sometimes we can learn
important lessons from sports like baseball. And we don't even have to be lucky, just clear-
thinking enough to pay attention.
David R. Henderson is an associate professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, California and a research fellow with the Hoover Institution. Charles L. Hooper
is president of Objective Insights, Inc. and a visiting fellow with the Hoover Institution. Their
book is Making Great Decisions in Business and Life (Chicago Park Press, 2006).
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